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Abstract
We study technology transfer in a spatial competition with two asymmetric licensees (firms)
with an outside innovator who decides how many licenses to offer and the optimal licensing
contract. We show the optimal licensing policy is pure royalty contract to both licensees leading
to a complete diffusion of the new technology. The result holds irrespective of the cost
differentials between the licensees and for innovation of all sizes, i.e. drastic or non-drastic. This
robust finding although supports the dominance of royalty licensing in practice, however
consumers may not be necessarily better off. We also throw light on the situation where the
innovator sells the patent right to one of the firms. Interestingly, we find that the inefficient firm
acquires the new technology and further licenses it to the efficient rival.
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1. Introduction
There is vast literature on technology transfer of cost reducing innovations through patent
licensing in the conventional models of quantity (Cournot) or price (Bertrand) competitions.
Relatively less attention is given on patent licensing in models of spatial competitions. It is a
growing area of research and many questions remained unanswered on the nature of licensing
contracts and their robustness. In this paper, we address the problem of an outside innovator
(independent research lab), who wishes to license a new cost reducing innovation to the
competing firm(s) in a duopoly market under spatial competition. The firms are not symmetric
on their costs of production and the product is horizontally differentiated. We capture the
horizontal product differentiation through the well-known linear city model (a la Hotelling,
1929) where firms are located at the end points of a unit interval and consumers are uniformly
distributed over the interval. Each consumer buys exactly one unit the product, hence the demand
is inelastic. We assume the market is fully covered, hence the total market demand is fixed. 1
These features of Hotelling’s model is fundamentally different from the conventional models of
product differentiation in Bertrand and Cournot framework (a la Singh and Vives, 1984), where
the demand is typically elastic, and also changes with the degree of product differentiation. We
believe because of these fundamental differences in the modeling structure, the impact of
technology transfer of cost reducing innovations will have different implications on the optimal
licensing contracts and the ensuing market equilibrium.
In our study, we have the following game structure. In the first stage, we allow the
innovator to decide on the number of licenses to offer, i.e. to decide whether license a single firm
or both firms. It is a “once for all offer” (same as take-it or leave-it offer) game. In case, it
chooses to license to a single firm, it also decides whether it will license the efficient or the
inefficient firm and the offer game ends there. The firm(s) accept or reject the offer. In the
second stage, the firms compete in prices in the product market regardless whether the offer(s) is
accepted or rejected. In this paper, we are particularly interested to see the implications of a
1

In other words, we are looking into matured markets with established brands. As an example, think of a welldeveloped market of mobile devices (matured market implies a market with very high penetration rate of mobile
device usage, almost close to hundred percent, e.g. markets in most developed countries), say smart-phones, with
two established brands Apple or android phones (e.g. Samsung). Everybody needs one mobile phone and each
consumer has a distinct preference over one particular brand. It represents a typical situation with two competing
firms where the demand is inelastic and the market is fully covered. Other examples include competition between
well-known brands in food and beverage industry in the developed fast food markets.
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‘once for all offer’ from the innovator on the licensing policies. We discuss the significance of
this particular feature of the game later. First we provide an overview of our main findings.
The main results of the study are as follows. Under fixed fee licensing, if one license is
offered, the innovator will always choose to license the efficient firm. The main result under
fixed licensing is to license both firms for smaller size of innovations, otherwise license only to
the efficient firm. In the case of auction, when one license is auctioned it will be always won by
the efficient firm, and is also better than auctioning two licenses for the innovator. Comparing
between fixed fee and auction, we get ‘by-an-large’ if the initial cost difference between firms
are sufficiently high then fixed fee licensing to the efficient firm is optimal whereas if the cost
difference is not that high then auctioning of the license to the efficient firm is optimal. When we
consider pure royalty licensing, if one license is offered, it will be always offered to the efficient
firm. However, it is optimal to the innovator to offer two licenses under pure royalty. As for the
overall optimal licensing for the innovator is concerned, we find a very robust finding, namely,
offering pure royalty contracts to both firms is always optimal, and it is true irrespective of the
size of innovation, drastic or non-drastic; or the degree of cost asymmetry of the licensees. A
complete diffusion of technology also happens in the equilibrium as both firms get the new
technology. Fixed fee or auctioning of license(s) are never optimal in this environment. Thus,
this result also supports the overall dominance of royalty contracts in practice. To this end, it is
also important to note that from the point of view of the competition authority, encouraging fixed
fee licensing to both firms would lead to maximization of consumer surplus due to uniform
decrease in costs of production of the firms which also lower the final prices of the product.
However, from the point of view of the innovator it is optimal to offer two licenses using the
royalty licensing scheme. Thus both from the innovator and regulatory perspective offering two
licenses are optimal but the nature of the contract will be different.
We further extend our analysis to see if instead of licensing, the innovator wishes to
transfer the technology by selling the right of the new innovation to one of the firms.
Interestingly, when it comes to selling, we find that the innovator will always choose the
inefficient firm to sell the technology. Transferring the new technology to an inefficient firm
only is a new finding that was never found in the literature of patent licensing. In other papers,
where selling the technology is considered with asymmetric licensees, either it is sold to the
efficient firm only (Sinha 2016) or sold to any firm, i.e. cost asymmetry did not matter (Banerjee
2

and Poddar 2019). This implies the nature of competition and the play of the game (e.g. once for
all offer contract) actually matters. Noting this and other results we obtain here, below we
motivate our analysis of “once for all offer’ technology transfer mechanism and its implication
from a managerial and regulatory policy perspective.

1.1 Once for all offer – relevance and related study
First of all, we would like to say that once for all or take-it or leave-it offer from the
innovator to potential licensees is not new in the industries and majority of the papers in the
licensing literature follow this same game structure (starting from Katz and Shapiro (1986),
Kamien and Tauman (1986), to the recent ones Poddar and Sinha (2004), Sen and Tauman
(2007), Sinha (2016) among many others). It is just that the term take-it or leave-it (i.e. once for
all) offer is not explicitly mentioned in the papers. As an exception, Banerjee and Poddar (2019),
relaxed the assumption of once for all offer, and looked into the case when an initial offer from
the outside innovator is rejected by one licensee, the game continues and the offer goes to the
other licensee. In other words, the game in Banerjee and Poddar (2019) has a sequential structure
as far as the licensing offer from the innovator is concerned. Because of this fundamental change
in the time structure of the licensing game, Banerjee and Poddar (2019) show optimal licensing
policies not only depend on the innovation size, but also on the degree of cost asymmetry
between the licensees. As the time structure changes, so does the opportunity cost (payoff from
outside options) of the licensees which in turn drive the results differently. It is interesting to see
when we bring back the more familiar, take it or leave it type offer (time) structure in the context
of asymmetric licensees, would there be any further implications on the licensing policies. As we
show in this study, our results here have an affirmative answer to this question. In particular, we
show that the optimal licensing policy neither depends on the size of the innovation nor on the
cost asymmetry between the licensees. 2 Therefore, the time structure of the licensing game
matters. However, at the same time we would like to point out that equilibrium licensing contract
obtained in the take-it or leave-it offer game is (weakly) sub-optimal to the innovator compared
to the equilibrium licensing contract offered in the sequential licensing offer game (Banerjee and
Poddar 2019).
We understand which time structure in the offer game is preferred is an open question. But we do not get into that
debate here.
2

3

Now moving on to the practical side, why a take-it or leave-it offer will be generally
more attractive to the innovator? Simply because, this offer will be overall less costly (both in
terms of real time and real cost) as opposed to sequential offers to the innovator and participating
firms. Here for simplification we have two potential firms/licensees, but when we have n
asymmetric potential licensees, just assuming a very little cost of delay to the innovator if the
offer is rejected in every round, the overall cost to execute the contract to innovator will be
prohibitively high. Hence not realistic for the innovator to follow that path. This is also probably
the main reason in the literature of patent licensing where we see most of the papers only
consider take-it or leave-it offer games, which is indeed practically relevant and observed in
most industries. It is of no surprise that most of the licensing contracts in the industries originate
from once-for-all i.e. take-it or leave-it offer structures which is closely studied in this paper.
We provide a recent example. Bounie et. al. (2019) examine the strategies of a data
intermediary selling customized consumer information to firms for the purpose of price
discrimination. Among other data transfer mechanisms they also consider a take it or leave it
offer where the data seller doesn’t offer the second firm if the first firm declines the offer. They
show that for the data intermediary take it or leave it offer is not optimum although consumer
surplus is maximum under take it or leave it offer. Thus a data protection authority or a
regulatory authority seeking to maximize consumer surplus might find it optimal to implement
the take it or leave it offer type data transfer mechanism.
It is also true that a wide variety of licensing mechanisms turn out to be optimal
depending on the modeling structure is also verified by the theoretical literature on patent
licensing. However, in the empirical literature, we do see a prevalence of one particular kind of
licensing contract, namely per-unit royalty. For example, Rostoker (1983) finds that licensing by
royalty alone are used in 39% of the cases, a fixed fee is used in 13%, and both instruments
together i.e. a two-part tariff is used in 46% of the cases. Earlier, Taylor and Silberston (1973)
found similar percentages among different licensing policies in their study. Macho-Stadler et. al
(1996) find, using Spanish data, that 59% of the contracts have only royalty payments, 28% have
fixed fee payments, and 13% include both fixed and royalty fees (i.e. two-part tariff). More
recently, Thursby et.al (2001) find royalties are most frequently used with 81% of respondents
“almost always” use royalties, while 16% report “often” using royalties. Our once for all offer
modeling structure here, which provides royalty as the only robust optimal licensing contract
4

from the innovator, does also provide additional support of dominance of royalty in practice
although the welfare of the consumers may not get maximized.
Therefore, both from theoretical and empirical perspective, it is important to identify the
specific game structure or the play of the game and its implications on the outcome. This study
aids in providing a robust foundation on the theory of technology transfer through various
licensing schemes in oligopolistic markets when firms are asymmetric. The specific role of once
for all offer in this paper essentially makes a case in support of the above objective and fills a
gap in the literature.

1.2 Market for technology, number of licenses and factors that affect licensing –
managerial and regulator perspective
To explore the facts mentioned above, we needed to do a systematic analysis. To do that
in this paper, we also focus our attention on the following issues.
(i)

The implication when the outside innovator decides how many licenses to offer (one or
two) when there are two asymmetric potential licensees

(ii)

Consider all possible available licensing schemes, namely fixed fee, auction, and royalty;
and the optimal licensing contract of the innovator

(iii)

Find whether a complete diffusion of the new technology occurs in the equilibrium and
its implication on consumer welfare

(iv)

Instead of licensing, other form of technology transfer for cost reducing innovation,
namely selling the patent right to one of the firms
We try to find an answer to all of the above in this study from a policy and managerial

perspective. For example, under Banerjee and Poddar (2019) game structure when offering one
license is optimal (the case of fixed fee), complete diffusion of technology does not happen,
while in our ‘once for all offer’ game structure, it always happens as both firms get the new
technology (under royalty) in equilibrium under optimal licensing. Secondly, even if complete
diffusion of technology happens under our game structure, however, consumer surplus is actually
maximized when complete diffusion of technology happens through fixed fee contracts to both
firms. Some of these outcomes need to be noted.
This paper can also be linked to the work by Rey and Salant (2012) in a vertical structure
5

(upstream-downstream firms). They argue that an upstream patentee might not offer more
numbers of licenses since it dissipates downstream firms payoffs through increased competition
and therefore reduces possible extraction payoff of the upstream patentee. We see similar effect
in our study in the case of auction policy licensing and also the fixed fee licensing scheme where
the patentee might optimally offer a single license to reduce the competition effect. Further study
by Gambardella (2002), Gambardella, Giuri and Luzzi (2007), Arora and Gambardella (2010)
focus on the market for technologies and factors that affect licensing and technology transfer.
These papers focus mainly on the transaction costs that are present in these kinds of markets and
its impact on the transfer of new technologies and its welfare impacts on the firms and the
consumers. In our paper, however there are no information frictions but the optimal number of
licenses and the extent of technology diffusion crucially depend on the type of technology
transfer regime chosen by an outside innovator which has important policy implications.

1.3 A brief survey relevant to licensing in spatial competitions
Earlier Poddar and Sinha (2004) analyzed optimal licensing strategy for an outside
innovator in the Hotelling framework but with symmetric firms only. Here we extend that
analysis where the potential licensees are asymmetric. Lu and Poddar (2014) examined various
licensing schemes of an insider patentee in an asymmetric duopoly model of spatial competitions
and found a fairly robust outcome that two-part tariff licensing is optimal among all possible
licensing arrangements. Given that analysis with an insider patentee, a natural question would be
to follow up, what happens when the patentee is an outsider and there are two asymmetric
potential licensees in a spatial framework? We answer that question in this paper with the added
feature of ‘once for all offer’.
Muto (1993), using a standard (non-spatial) product differentiation framework and price
competition with an outsider patentee, showed that only royalty licensing is optimal (compared
to auction and fixed fee). From Muto (1993) and from our present analysis here, broadly one
thing that comes out is, royalty licensing is generally optimal in a model of product
differentiation (spatial or non-spatial) with price competition and outsider patentee. This
outcome can be contrasted with the earlier literature on patent licensing where fixed fee licensing
is generally shown to be optimal with an outsider patentee under quantity competition and
royalty licensing is typically optimal with an insider patentee. Kabiraj (2004) analyzes optimal
6

technology licensing when the market is characterized by Stackelberg competition and shows
royalty dominates other modes when the innovation size is small. For larger innovations, while
fixed fee dominates royalty; auction is optimal from an outside innovator’s perspective. 3
Among other studies in spatial competition, Kabiraj and Lee (2011) considered an insider
patentee model and showed how the existence of a royalty equilibrium can depend on the
transport cost. On the other hand, Matsumura and Matsushima (2008) and Matsumura et. al.
(2010) endogenize the location choice of the firms in an insider patentee model and show how
the technology transfer recovers the existence of a location equilibrium in pure strategies. In this
paper, we assumed fixed locations of the firms and focused on the optimal modes of technology
transfer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we lay out the model. Different
licensing schemes are analyzed in detail in section 3. Section 4 discusses the extension to the
selling game of patent right. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. The Linear City Model
Consider two firms, firm A and firm B located in a linear city represented by an unit interval
[0,1]. Firm A is located at 0 whereas firm B is located at 1 that is at the two extremes of the
linear city. Both firms produce homogenous goods with constant but different marginal costs of
production and compete in prices. We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed over the

interval [0,1]. Each consumer purchases exactly one unit of the good either from firm A or firm
B. The transportation cost per unit of distance is 𝑡𝑡 and it is borne by the consumers. 4

The utility function of a consumer located at 𝑥𝑥 is given by:
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

if buys from firm A

3

In a competitive environment under complete information, if the patentee is an outside innovator, it has been
generally shown that fixed fee licensing is optimal (see Katz and Shapiro (1986), Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986),
Kamien et al., (1992), Stamatopolous and Tauman (2009)); whereas per-unit royalty contract is optimal when the
patentee is an insider (see Wang (1998), (2002), Kamien and Tauman (2002)).
4
It is well known that in the linear city model with linear transportation costs equilibrium in location choice might
not exist. It exists if the firms are sufficiently far apart while competing in prices and in this paper, we assume the
firms to be at the extremes of the city. Thus, existence related issues do not arise. If we had considered a convex
transport cost (say a quadratic cost), then from d’Aspremont et al. (1979), we know that the equilibrium location of
the firms always exist and are at the two end-points of the city. So even if we had assumed such cost function, the
qualitative results of our model would not have changed.
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= 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − (1 − 𝑥𝑥 )𝑡𝑡

if buys from firm B

We assume that the market is fully covered and the total demand is normalized to 1. The demand
functions for firm A and firm B can be calculated as:
1

𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 = +
2

= 0

= 1
and 𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 = 1 − 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴

𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 −𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴
2𝑡𝑡

if 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ∈ (−𝑡𝑡. 𝑡𝑡)
if 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ≤ −𝑡𝑡
if 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝑡𝑡

There is an outside innovator (an independent research lab) who has a cost reducing innovation.

The innovation helps reduce the per-unit marginal costs of the licensee firm(s) uniformly by 𝜖𝜖. 𝜖𝜖

is also known as the size of the innovation. The innovator has the option to choose number of
licenses i.e. licensing the innovation to a single firm or both firms. We will consider different
forms of licensing viz. fixed fee licensing, auction policy and royalty licensing. We will examine
both non-drastic and drastic innovations. An innovation is drastic when the size of the cost
reducing innovation is sufficiently high such that the firm not getting the license goes out of the
market and the licensee becomes the monopoly. 5

The timing of the game is given as follows:
Stage 1: The outside innovator decides to license its innovation (to either one or both firms). The
firm(s) (potential licensees) accepts or rejects the offer. In case of offering one license, if the first
firm rejects the game ends and firms get their pre-licensing profits.
Stage 2: The firms compete in prices and products are sold to consumers.

2.1. Absence of Outside Innovator – The Pre-Licensing Game
First we examine the case where the outside innovator is not in the scenario and two asymmetric
firms A and B are competing in the market with old production technology. Let us denote the
constant marginal costs of production of firms A and B by 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 and 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 respectively and define 𝛿𝛿 =
5

Following the definition of Arrow (1962) on drastic and non-drastic innovation.
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𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴. To fix ideas, suppose 𝛿𝛿 = 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 > 0, i.e. firm A is the efficient firm without loss of

generality. We also assume that 𝛿𝛿 ≤ 3𝑡𝑡 so that the less efficient firm’s equilibrium quantity is
positive before the innovation takes place. Therefore, the no-licensing equilibrium prices,

demands and profits can be given as:
1

1

(1)

1

1

(2)

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)

(3)

𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = (3𝑡𝑡 + 2𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 ) = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)
3

3

𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 2𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 ) = 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 + (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 =

𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 =
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 =

𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 =

3

1

6𝑡𝑡
1

6𝑡𝑡
1

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 ) =

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 ) =

18𝑡𝑡
1

18𝑡𝑡

1

6𝑡𝑡
1

6𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 + 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 )2 =

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 )2 =

3

(4)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)
1

18𝑡𝑡
1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2

(5)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2

(6)

3. Presence of Outside Innovator – The Licensing Game
Now we consider the presence of an outside innovator. If the outside innovator licenses to firm A
(the efficient firm), and if 𝜖𝜖 > 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿, then firm A becomes monopoly and firm B goes out of

the market. On the other hand, if the outside innovator licenses to firm B i.e. the inefficient firm,
then firm B becomes monopoly and firm A goes out of the market only when 𝜖𝜖 > 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿. Now

what is interesting to note is that when two licenses are offered, if the first firm rejects, the offer
can potentially be accepted by the second firm. So when 𝜖𝜖 > 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 but 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 then if firm

A rejects and B accepts, firm B doesn’t become a monopoly since the size of the innovation is
not sufficient to drive firm A out of the market. Similarly for 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 < 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 when only

one license is offered and it is offered to the inefficient firm B and it accepts, firm A doesn’t go
out of the market. Hence in our context, an innovation is drastic only when 𝜖𝜖 > 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿,

otherwise it is non-drastic.

Now we consider different forms of licensing one by one. We start with fixed fee licensing.

9

3.1 Fixed Fee Licensing
3.1.1: Fixed fee licensing to one firm
Consider the case where the innovator licenses its innovation to firm A by charging a fixed fee.
The post licensing marginal cost of firm A will be 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝜖𝜖 and that of firm B will be 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 . In this
situation the equilibrium prices, demands and profits can be given as:
1

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹 = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝜖𝜖 + (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )
1

(7)

3

𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 = 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 + (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹 =
𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 =
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹 =

𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 =

1

6𝑡𝑡
1

6𝑡𝑡
1

(9)

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )

(10)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )

18𝑡𝑡
1

(8)

3

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴

(11)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2

(12)

One can also work out the above expressions when the innovator licenses its innovation to firm
B.
We show when one license being offered under fixed fee, the efficient firm will always be
offered the license for all kinds of innovations, drastic and non-drastic. Since the maximum
willingness to pay for the efficient firm is always higher than the inefficient firm, the outside
innovator can always extract more from the efficient firm. Thus it is optimal for the innovator to
license it to the efficient firm and we state that formally in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: When only one license is offered under fixed fee the innovator will always license it
to the efficient firm.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Next we consider the possibility of the innovator offering more than one license, viz. two
licenses in this case.
3.1.2. Fixed Fee Licensing to both Firms
10

Consider the case when the outside innovator is licensing its innovation to both firms A and B by
charging a fixed fee. In this situation the marginal costs of both firms fall by 𝜖𝜖 and the relevant
variables can be calculated as follows:
1

(13)

1

(14)

𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝜖𝜖 + (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)
3

𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝜖𝜖 + (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)
3
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 =

𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 =
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 =

𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 =

1

6𝑡𝑡
1

6𝑡𝑡
1

(16)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)

18𝑡𝑡
1

(15)

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴

(17)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵

(18)

Now since both firms are offered the license if any one firm rejects, the other firm can potentially
accept the contract. Thus the no-acceptance outside option payoffs of both the firms is not the
pre-licensing payoff anymore. The no-acceptance payoff of any one firm will be calculated
assuming the other firm accepts the contract.
Comparing the revenues earned by the outside innovator from licensing to a single firm (efficient
firm) and both firms, we find the innovator will always opt to license the technology to the
efficient firm A if the innovation size is sufficiently high, i.e. 𝜖𝜖 ≥

innovation size is sufficiently low such 𝜖𝜖 <
firms. We state the result below:

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
3

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
3

. Otherwise if the

holds the innovator will license to both the

Proposition 1: Under fixed fee licensing, the outside innovator will license the innovation to
both firms if 𝜖𝜖 <

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
3

Proof: See Appendix 2.

holds, otherwise it will license it to the efficient firm for all 𝜖𝜖 ≥
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2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
3

.

The intuition of the above result can be given as follows: when the innovation size is small i.e.
when 𝜖𝜖 <

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)

, the gain to the efficient firm of obtaining the licensing vis-à-vis no licensing

when 𝜖𝜖 ≥

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)

. Therefore the gain for the innovator from extraction remains low if it licenses

3

(i.e. the outside option) is low compared to obtaining license when the innovation size is big i.e.
3

to the efficient firm when innovation size is small. In this scenario, the innovator optimally
licenses the technology to both firms since the total added-up net payoff of both the firms exceed
that from licensing the single efficient firm only. But for relatively large size of innovation, i.e.
𝜖𝜖 ≥

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

, the efficient firm’s gain from the new technology vis-à-vis no licensing (i.e. the

outside option) is sufficiently high and more compared to added-up net payoff of licensing to
both the firms. When the innovation is licensed to both the firms then costs of both the firms get
reduced and the competition effect drives down the gains of both firms. Thus the outside
innovator extracts less under this case of large innovation. Therefore, in equilibrium we get that
the innovator will be able to extract more from both firms if 𝜖𝜖 <
the technology only to the efficient firm if 𝜖𝜖 ≥

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
3

.

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
3

whereas it will license

This result is in stark contrast to Banerjee and Poddar (2019), Sinha (2016) where under

fixed fee licensing the innovator will always license its innovation to only one firm viz. the
efficient firm. In our case with once-for-all offer the no-acceptance payoff (outside option
payoff) is same as pre-licensing payoff which is higher compared to the case where the offer
goes to the other firm (if rejected by the initial firm) as assumed in Banerjee and Poddar (2019).
Thus a change in the rule of the game, viz. once-for-all contract adds new dimension by
increasing the outside option payoff of no-acceptance and we get an interesting twist in our
perceived knowledge on technology licensing under fixed fee. But from a normative point of
view note that consumer surplus will be higher if the innovator licenses it to both the firms,
resulting in lowering of costs for both the firms and lower prices of both the products. Therefore
there is a case for the competition authorities to enforce licensing to both firms for all innovation
sizes which guarantees a level playing field and increased consumer surplus.
Next, we analyze licensing through auction policy.

3.2. Auction Policy
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In case of auction policy when one license is offered/auctioned both firms can potentially win the
license depending upon the bids. Therefore both firms know that if it doesn’t win then the other
firm can potentially win it and therefore the losing payoff (outside option payoff) is not the notechnology transfer payoff anymore. This case is conceptually similar to the case where if one
firm doesn’t win then the other firm gets the license even with once for all offer. In case of two
licenses being offered the no-acceptance payoff will be calculated as if the other firm can
potentially win the contract and therefore will be similar to the one license auction case.
3.2.1. Auction Policy - Only one license offered
We first consider the case where only a single license is being auctioned. We first consider the
non-drastic cases.
Non-Drastic Case (i) (𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿):

Suppose the innovator wants to license its innovation to only one firm through a first price
auction. If firm A wins the license its payoff will be
license and firm B wins it, firm A’s payoff will be
willing a bid a maximum amount

1

18𝑡𝑡

1

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 . Therefore, firm A will be

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 −

firm B will be willing to bid the maximum amount
2𝜖𝜖(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
9𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 and if firm A loses the
1

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 =

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 −

2𝜖𝜖(3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿)

1

18𝑡𝑡

9𝑡𝑡

. Similarly

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 =

. Since the inefficient firm B’s bid is always less than efficient firm A’s bid, under

complete information, firm A can always ensure that it wins the auction by bidding slightly
higher than the maximum possible bid of firm B, i.e. 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴∗ =

∗
innovator’s payoff will be 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
=

2𝜖𝜖(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
9𝑡𝑡

2𝜖𝜖(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
9𝑡𝑡

+ 𝑘𝑘 where 𝑘𝑘 ≈ 0. The outside

+ 𝑘𝑘, 𝑘𝑘 ≈ 0. This mechanism, although a

first price auction, effectively plays out like a second price auction since the efficient firm bids
and pays the second highest bid (marginally higher).
Non-Drastic Case (ii) (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 ≤ 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿):

This is the case where firm A becomes a monopoly if it gets the license but firm B doesn’t. Firm
A’s net gain from winning the auction is (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) −
gain will be
1

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 whereas firm B’s net

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2. One can easily show that (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) −

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 >

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 ∀ 𝜖𝜖 ∈ [3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿, 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿). Therefore, firm A will again win the auction by biding
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𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴∗ =

1

18𝑡𝑡

∗
(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 + 𝑘𝑘 and therefore 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
=

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 + 𝑘𝑘. In this case

also the auction mechanism plays out like a second price auction and firm A always wins it.
Next we consider the drastic innovation case.
Drastic Case (𝜖𝜖 ≥ 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿):

Under this situation if firm A wins its payoff from winning will be (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) but if it loses it

gets zero. Similarly firm B’s payoff from winning is (𝜖𝜖 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) and the losing payoff will be

zero. Thus firm A will be willing to bid the maximum amount (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) and firm B will be
willing to bid at most (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) . Given complete information, firm A can again win the
∗
= (𝜖𝜖 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) +
auction by bidding 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴∗ = (𝜖𝜖 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) + 𝑘𝑘, 𝑘𝑘 ≈ 0 and therefore 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑘𝑘, 𝑘𝑘 ≈ 0.

Given above we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 2: When only one license is auctioned then the efficient firm always wins the auction
irrespective of whether be the size of the innovation i.e. drastic or non-drastic.
The intuition is not difficult to comprehend since the efficient firm’s net gain will always be
higher than the inefficient firm and therefore given complete information, the efficient firm can
always outbid the inefficient firm and win the auction.
3.2.2. Auction Policy - Two licenses offered
Suppose the innovator offers two licenses to both the firms subject to a minimum floor bid of the
bidders (i.e. firms) 6. Both the bidders pay their respective bids. We analyze this below:
Non-Drastic Case (i) (𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿):

In this non-drastic case if firm A gets the license and both firms get the license its payoff will be
1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 and if firm A doesn’t get the license (and firm B gets it) its payoff will be
1

1

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 +

𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 . Therefore, firm A’s maximum possible bid is18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 − 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 =
𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡+2𝛿𝛿−𝜖𝜖)
1

18𝑡𝑡

18𝑡𝑡

. On the other hand, if firm B gets the license and both get it, firm B will receive

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 whereas if it loses the auction (and firm A wins) firm B’s payoff will be

𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 . Thus firm B will be willing to bid a maximum of

6

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 −

1

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 −

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 =

We assume that the innovator will set a minimum floor bid above which the firms have to bid to get the license.
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𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡−2𝛿𝛿−𝜖𝜖)
18𝑡𝑡

. The outside innovator will set a minimum bid equal to the inefficient firm’s

maximum possible bid, in this case firm B’s maximum bid

𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡−2𝛿𝛿−𝜖𝜖)
18𝑡𝑡

, to ensure that both firms

can possibly get the license and also the total revenue is maximized. Firm A being the efficient
firm will optimally bid the minimum required to get the license, i.e. 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴∗ =

equal to firm B’s optimum bid which is 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵∗ =
∗
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡ℎ
=

being offered.

𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡−2𝛿𝛿−𝜖𝜖)
9𝑡𝑡

𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡−2𝛿𝛿−𝜖𝜖)
18𝑡𝑡

1

Here, the optimal bids by both the firms will be
1

9𝑡𝑡

18𝑡𝑡

which is

. The outside innovator’s payoff will be

and we note that it is strictly lower than the case of a single license

Non-Drastic Case (ii) (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 < 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿):

∗
will be 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ
=

𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡−2𝛿𝛿−𝜖𝜖)

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 and the revenue of the innovator

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 . This is lower than

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 for 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 < 𝜖𝜖 <

3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿, which is the innovator’s payoff of licensing one auction.
Drastic Case (𝜖𝜖 > 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿):

In this situation both firms will optimally bid
∗
be 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ
=

1

9𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 and the revenue of the innovator will

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 and this is lower than (𝜖𝜖 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) which is the innovator’s

payoff of licensing one auction under this case.

Therefore, given above, one can state our next proposition.
Proposition 2: Under auction policy, the outside innovator will always offer one license and the
efficient firm will win the auction.
When two licenses are offered both firms’ costs get reduced and the competitive effect drives
down possible gain from technology licensing for both the firms compared to the case when only
one firm gets the license. Therefore when two licenses are offered, both firms will optimally bid
less since the net gain vis-à-vis not accepting is much lower and this is known to both firms
under complete information. The efficient firm knows that it can just bid enough (equal to the
inefficient firm’s bid) to get the license. All these above effects drive down the bids of both the
efficient and the inefficient firm and the total revenue which is equal to twice of the inefficient
firms bid falls short of the efficient firms bid when only one license is offered. Thus the outside
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innovator can extract more when only one license is auctioned and it goes to the efficient firm.
This result is similar to what we get in the literature on information selling (Montes et. al.
(2018)). Montes et. al. (2018) show that a consumer data supplier would optimally sell the data
to one firm and would implement that through an auction mechanism. Also if the data purchasing
firms differ in efficiency then it will optimally sell to the efficient firm. What we get here in case
of technology licensing is in essence similar to their result on information selling. Even if the
firms the symmetric, it is optimal for the innovator to auction the technology to any single firm
and not both. Given this we now go for a comparison between fixed fee and auction policy
licensing schemes.
3.2.3. Comparing Fixed fee and Auction policy
Now we can compare the payoffs of the innovator from fixed fee licensing and auction policy.
The next result throws some light on this.
Proposition 3: Given a choice between fixed fee licensing and auction policy, we get the
following:
(a). For 𝜖𝜖 <

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
,
3

if 𝛿𝛿 <

3𝑡𝑡
,
4

fixed fee to both firms is optimum for 0 < 𝜖𝜖 < 2𝛿𝛿 and auction to the

efficient firm is optimal for 2𝛿𝛿 < 𝜖𝜖 <

(b). For

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

5

< 𝛿𝛿 <

3𝑡𝑡
4

If 𝛿𝛿 ≥

3𝑡𝑡
,
4

fixed fee is optimal for all 0 < 𝜖𝜖 <

≤ 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿), if 𝛿𝛿 > 𝑡𝑡, fixed fee is better for all

But for 𝛿𝛿 ≤ 𝑡𝑡, if 𝛿𝛿 <
3𝑡𝑡

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
.
3

3𝑡𝑡
5

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

holds, auction policy will be preferred for all

, auction policy is preferred for

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

< 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿).

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

< 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿). If

< 𝜖𝜖 < 6(𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) and fixed fee to the efficient

firm will be preferred for 6(𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) < 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿). When

firm will be preferred for all

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
.
3

< 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿).

3𝑡𝑡
4

< 𝛿𝛿 < 𝑡𝑡 fixed fee to the efficient

(c). For (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) ≤ 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿), if 𝛿𝛿 < 0.3𝑡𝑡 auction policy will be preferred to fixed fee
licensing for all (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) ≤ 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿). If 0. 3𝑡𝑡 < 𝛿𝛿 < 0.6𝑡𝑡, then ∃ 𝜖𝜖̃ = [(6𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) −

�𝛿𝛿(30𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)] ∈ [(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿), (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)) such that if 𝜖𝜖 < 𝜖𝜖̃, then auction policy is optimal, whereas
for 𝜖𝜖 > 𝜖𝜖̃ fixed fee licensing to the efficient firm is optimal. If 𝛿𝛿 > 0.6𝑡𝑡, then fixed fee licensing
over auction for all (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) ≤ 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿).
(d). For 𝜖𝜖 ≥ (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) auction policy will be preferred if 𝛿𝛿 < 0.3𝑡𝑡 and fixed fee licensing to the

efficient firm will be preferred if 𝛿𝛿 > 0.3𝑡𝑡.
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Proof: See Appendix 3.
Here we get that ‘by-an-large’ if the cost difference between firms are sufficiently high then
fixed fee licensing to the efficient firm is optimal whereas if the cost difference is not that high
then auctioning of the license to the efficient firm is optimal. This is due to the fact that with
‘once-for-all’ offer the net gain from fixed fee licensing to the efficient firm is sufficiently high
only when the efficient firm is ‘sufficiently efficient’ compared to the inefficient firm, i.e. the
cost difference is sufficiently high. This gain is extracted by the innovator through fixed fee and
therefore fixed fee licensing outweighs auction policy for higher cost difference between firms.
In addition to this, auction policy as a mechanism doesn’t really have that ‘once-for-all’ offer
kind of an effect since the other firm can always win if the previous firm doesn’t win. Therefore
the ‘once-for-all’ feature does have a bite for fixed fee licensing and therefore we get this result.
One minor difference is for the case 𝜖𝜖 <

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

where fixed fee is chosen for lower level of cost

difference which is an exactly the opposite result compared to the other ranges of 𝜖𝜖. This is due
to the fact that for 𝜖𝜖 <

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

with ‘once-for-all’ offer fixed fee licensing is done to both firms

which dampens the payoff of the innovator because of the competitive effect of both firms’ cost
reduction. Thus the cost difference doesn’t change is licensing and the payoff from fixed fee
licensing is not affected by the initial cost difference of firms that much. But since under auction
policy (which plays out like a second price auction) the efficient firm always wins it and only
single license is offered, payoff from auction policy increases the more is the cost difference. So
when 𝜖𝜖 is sufficiently low, auction policy does better for higher cost difference. For other cases
fixed fee does better for higher cost difference.

We note that the above result is again in sharp contract with Banerjee and Poddar (2019)

and Stamatopolous and Tauman (2009) where both show the superiority of fixed fee licensing
over auction policy. The once-for-all structure of the contract we consider here is the basis of
different sets of results. Once again for the competition authorities perspective it might be
optimal to encourage fixed fee licensing to both firms compared to auction since that will lead to
increased consumer surplus.
Next we proceed and analyze royalty licensing in detail.

3.3. Royalty licensing
17

3.3.1. Royalty licensing to one firm
Suppose the outside innovator licenses the innovation to firm A by charging a per unit royalty
fee denoted by 𝑟𝑟. 7 Therefore, firm A has to pay 𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 to the outside innovator. Given this, firm

A’s profit function will be 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 − (𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝜖𝜖 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 and firm B’s profit function can be
written as 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 − 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 . The equilibrium prices, demands and profits can be given as:
1

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝜖𝜖 + 𝑟𝑟 + (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 − 𝑟𝑟)
1

3

𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅 = 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 + (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 + 𝑟𝑟)
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 =
𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅 =
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 =

𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 =

1

6𝑡𝑡
1

6𝑡𝑡
1

1

(20)

3

(21)

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 − 𝑟𝑟)

(22)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 + 𝑟𝑟)

18𝑡𝑡
18𝑡𝑡

(19)

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 − 𝑟𝑟)2

(23)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 + 𝑟𝑟)2

(24)

Lemma 3: In case of royalty licensing to only one firm the outside innovator always offers the
license to the efficient firm.
Proof: See Appendix 4.
Since the efficient firm produces more output (at least weakly) compared to the inefficient firm
and also the royalty rate is higher for the efficient firm, the revenue for the outside innovator is
always higher when it licenses to the efficient firm compared to when it licenses to the
inefficient firm. Therefore the innovator will always license it to the efficient firm.
The innovator’s optimal royalty contract and the revenue to the efficient firm A, can be
𝜖𝜖

characterized as follows: 𝑟𝑟 ∗ = 𝜖𝜖 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 = 6𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) ∀ 𝜖𝜖 ≤ (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿), 𝑟𝑟 ∗ =
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 =

(3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖)2
24𝑡𝑡

if

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) < 𝜖𝜖 < 9𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 and

3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖
2

and

𝑟𝑟 ∗ = 𝜖𝜖 − 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 = 𝜖𝜖 − 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿

∀ 𝜖𝜖 > 9𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿. In all the above cases firm A will accept the contract since it gets weakly greater
profit compared to the pre-licensing case.

7

We also consider when the innovator offers royalty to firm B (Appendix 4).
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Royalty Licensing to both Firms
Suppose the outside innovator licenses the technology to both firms through per-unit royalty
licensing. Since the total output produced by both the firms add up to 1 it is optimum for the
innovator to charge 𝑟𝑟 = 𝜖𝜖 to both the firms and the innovator’s maximum possible payoff will be

𝜖𝜖. 8 We can show the following: Suppose we assume asymmetric royalty rates for both firms i.e.
𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 for Firm A and 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 for Firm B where 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 ≠ 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 . To fix ideas denote ∆𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 > 0. The
optimal prices, quantities and profits can therefore be calculated as
1

(25)

1

(26)

𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴RBoth = 𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 − 𝜖𝜖 + 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 + (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − ∆𝑟𝑟)
3

𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵RBoth = 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝜖𝜖 + 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 + (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + ∆𝑟𝑟)
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴RBoth =
𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵RBoth =
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴RBoth =

𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵RBoth =

1

6𝑡𝑡
1

6𝑡𝑡
1

3

(28)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + ∆𝑟𝑟)

18𝑡𝑡
1

(27)

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − ∆𝑟𝑟)

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − ∆𝑟𝑟)2

(29)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + ∆𝑟𝑟)2

(30)

Note the incentives for firm A. When firm A accepts its payoff is given by (29) whereas when
Firm A rejects then firm B can potentially accept the license and it’s payoff will be

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 −

𝜖𝜖 + 𝑟𝑟)2 . Given 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝜖𝜖 firm A’s decision will depend on the relative values of ∆𝑟𝑟 and (𝜖𝜖 − 𝑟𝑟). As

we have already argued that the innovator is better off charging 𝑟𝑟 as close to 𝜖𝜖 as possible and in

fact at the optimum 𝑟𝑟 = 𝜖𝜖, given ∆𝑟𝑟 > 0 firm A is better-off not accepting this asymmetric

royalty contract. Again if we assume ∆𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 < 0 we can see that Firm B is better off not
accepting the contract. Therefore, with asymmetric royalty rates any one firm will not accept the
contract and we go back to the single firm case.

So to make both the firms accept we need to assume symmetric royalty rates, without loss
of generality. Therefore, assuming 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 = 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑟 when both firms get the license, from (27) and

(28) we get that the industry output is 1 and therefore the total revenue of the outside innovator is
8

Market is covered according to our assumption.
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∗
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅ℎ
= 𝑟𝑟. Thus the outside innovator will optimally choose 𝑟𝑟 = 𝜖𝜖 and it’s revenue

∗
will be 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅ℎ
= 𝜖𝜖. We have already shown that both firm A and B will accept this

symmetric royalty contract. We don’t need to distinguish between drastic and non-drastic
innovation in this case as the effective unit cost remains unchanged for both firms.
Now in comparing innovator’s respective payoffs from licensing to one firm and to both firms
under royalty, we see that 𝜖𝜖 >

𝜖𝜖

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) since 𝛿𝛿 < 3𝑡𝑡 (by assumption), also 𝜖𝜖 >
6𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖)2
24𝑡𝑡

for

all (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) < 𝜖𝜖 < 9𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 (given 𝛿𝛿 < 3𝑡𝑡) and finally 𝜖𝜖 ≥ 𝜖𝜖 − 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 ∀ 𝜖𝜖 > 9𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 (given 𝛿𝛿 <
3𝑡𝑡). Therefore offering two licenses is optimal for the innovator.

Thus our main proposition under royalty is as follows.

Proposition 4: In case of royalty licensing, the innovator will always license its innovation to
both the firms irrespective of the size of innovation.
When the innovator offers a symmetric royalty contract to both the firms the optimal royalty is
set at 𝜖𝜖 and since the market is fully covered the total industry output is 1. Thus given the

constraint that 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝜖𝜖, the maximum possible revenue that the innovator can get is 𝜖𝜖. The
innovator cannot do better compared to this while offering the royalty contract to a single firm

whose output is less than the total market output. Thus it is optimal for the outside innovator to
offer the royalty licensing contract to both the firms. 9

Given above we are now in a position to compare all licensing schemes and find out the overall
optimal licensing policy for the outside innovator.

3.5. Optimal Licensing Policy
Comparing the payoff of the innovator from royalty licensing to both firms vis-à-vis fixed fee
∗
and auction policy we get that 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ
= 𝜖𝜖 exceeds both fixed fee licensing and auction

policy payoffs for all drastic and non-drastic technologies and therefore we get that it is optimal
9

One can also consider a two-part tariff licensing contract which is a mixture of fixed fee and royalty licensing.
However, we can show that the optimal two-part tariff licensing actually reduces to pure royalty to both firms that is
considered here. Proof is available upon request.
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for the innovator to go for royalty licensing to both firms and this holds for drastic and nondrastic innovation. Below we state the main proposition of this paper.
Proposition 5: Royalty licensing to both firms is optimum for the outside innovator irrespective
of the size of innovation and initial cost differences to the licensees. Fixed fee licensing or
auctioning of the license is never optimal. The payoff of the innovator is 𝑅𝑅∗ = 𝜖𝜖, for all 𝜖𝜖 > 0,

drastic or non-drastic.

We find pure royalty licensing to both firms is optimal for innovations of all sizes as well as
irrespective of cost differences of the licensees. The intuition of the above result can be put
forward as follows: with once-for-all offer the outside option payoff of the firms from rejecting a
licensing contract is fixed at the pre-licensing level. Thus the net gain from accepting a fixed fee
licensing contract for a firm is lower with once-for-all compared to the case when the offer goes
to the other firm in which case the rejection payoff (outside option) is much lower. Since the
optimal fixed fee licensing is done mainly to the single efficient firm this once-for-all scenario
dampens the net payoff of the licensee (efficient) firm and therefore the innovator can extract
less in this case. Whereas, in case of royalty licensing, it is optimal for the innovator to license
the technology to both the firms. Here the no-acceptance (outside option) payoff is similar to the
case of where if rejected the offer can be potentially accepted by the other firm. Thus the noacceptance payoff is much lower and therefore the net gain for the licensee firms from accepting
vis-a-vis rejecting is much higher. Therefore the innovator can potentially extract more from
royalty licensing to both firms compared to fixed fee licensing (to mainly the efficient firm).
Thus it is optimal for the innovator to go for royalty licensing to both firms. This result is
different from Banerjee and Poddar (2019) for asymmetric firms. In Banerjee and Poddar (2019),
fixed fee licensing to the efficient firm was optimal for greater cost difference (greater firm
asymmetry) whereas royalty licensing to both firms was optimal for lower cost difference.10
Interesting to note is that both the firms are extracted their entire cost reduction and are kept at
the pre-technology transfer level. The outside innovator does best extracting from both the firms
and this is the best that it can do.
10

This result is also qualitatively similar to Poddar and Sinha (2004) with symmetric firms where they get royalty
licensing to both firms to be optimal for innovation of all sizes. Therefore, it seems, that the ‘once-for-all’ offer to
some extent nullifies the ‘cost asymmetry’ dimension that was there in Banerjee and Poddar (2019).
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From the point of view of the regulatory options for a competition authority trying to
maximize consumer surplus royalty to both firms doesn’t lead to any increase in the total
consumer surplus. Therefore from the point of view of the competition authority encouraging
fixed fee licensing to both firms lead to maximized consumer surplus but from the point of view
of the innovator it is optimal to offer two-licenses using royalty licensing scheme. Thus both
from the innovator and regulatory perspective offering two licenses is optimal but the nature of
the contract changes.

4. Technology Selling Possibility
We now examine the possibility of selling the patent right to one of the firms.11 For this
purpose we make use of Banerjee and Poddar (2019) and Lu and Poddar (2014)’s results and
expressions. It is known from Lu and Poddar (2014) that post technology sale the buyer will
optimally license it further to its competitor using a two-part tariff licensing scheme.
Internalizing this possibility the innovator will optimally charge a fixed fee for the technology
sale. Using the expressions from Banerjee and Poddar (2019) and Lu and Poddar (2014) we can
proceed as follows. Suppose the innovation is non-drastic such that 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿, we know that

firm A’s total payoff from subsequent two-part tariff licensing will be
1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 −

1

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 + 𝜖𝜖 +

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜀𝜀)2 . This is the maximum that firm A can get by licensing the

technology to firm B. If firm A rejects, firm A will get the pre-technology transfer payoff which
1

is
1

18𝑡𝑡
1

18𝑡𝑡

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 . Therefore the outside innovator can potentially charge 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜖𝜖 +

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 +
(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 −

1

18𝑡𝑡
1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 −

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜀𝜀)2 −

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2

which

𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜖𝜖 +

is

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜀𝜀)2 from firm A which will be innovator’s payoff. Similarly if the
1

innovator sells it to firm B then the innovator can potentially charge 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜖𝜖 + 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 −
1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜀𝜀)2 . Comparing one can show that 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 > 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 and therefore the innovator will

optimally sell the technology to the inefficient firm B. Again if 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 < 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿, the

innovator can possibly extract a maximum of
1

1

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 + 𝜖𝜖 +
1

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 −
1

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2

from firm A and 𝜖𝜖 + 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 + 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 − 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜀𝜀)2 − 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 from
11

A pioneering study on selling patent right can be found in Tauman and Weng (2012).
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firm B. calculating we get that given 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 < 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 the innovator will optimally sell the

technology to the inefficient firm B. Finally, when the innovation is drastic, i.e. 𝜖𝜖 > 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿, the
1

1

innovator can possibly extract a maximum of 𝜖𝜖 + 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 from firm A and 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 +

𝜖𝜖 from firm B. Once again the innovator will sell the license to the inefficient firm B. Also in all
the above cases the payoff the innovator is greater than its licensing payoff which is 𝜖𝜖. Therefore
it is optimal for the innovator to sell the license to the inefficient firm B.

Proposition 6: It is optimum for the innovator to sell the innovation to the inefficient firm and
this holds irrespective of whether the innovation is drastic or non-drastic. The recipient firm
further licenses the innovation to the rival firm.
It is bit surprising to see that the innovator optimally sells the new technology to the
inefficient firm. This is due to the fact that the outside option (rejection payoff) is higher for the
efficient firm and therefore the fixed fee for selling has to internalize that fact. In Banerjee and
Poddar (2019) it was optimal for the innovator to sell the patent to any one of the firms who
subsequently licenses to the other firm. Thus the ‘identity invariance’ result of Banerjee and
Poddar (2019) doesn’t hold here with “once-for-all offer”. Moreover, our result is also different
to Sinha (2016) under Cournot competition where the innovator optimally sold the technology to
the efficient firm whereas we get the counter-intuitive result that the innovation will be sold to
the inefficient firm.

5. Conclusion
There is a volume of theoretical work on patent licensing studying about the optimal
licensing policies from the innovator to the potential licensee(s) under various possible scenarios.
Due to that and along with the empirical studies, we now fairly understand how the patent
licensing works optimally in any given scenario for the innovator. However, the study of patent
licensing in a framework of spatial competition of product differentiation is sparse. With outside
innovator, apart from Sinha and Poddar (2004) with symmetric firms and Banerjee and Poddar
(2019) with asymmetric firms, no paper has tried to fully explore the optimal technology
licensing in spatial framework. The spatial model also captures a real world scenario where
consumers have their ideal brand of product, buy exactly one unit and hence the demand is
23

inelastic, and the offer from the innovator to the potential licensees is once-for-all (unlike
Banerjee and Poddar (2019) or other studies). Analyzing this model, new insights are gained not
only on the several modes of technology transfer and their implications, but how once-for-all the
game structure and the nature of competition play a crucial role on the final outcome.
The main findings from the study are as follows. We show the optimal licensing contract
involves, offering two pure royalty contracts to both licensees under all circumstances, i.e.
irrespective of the licensees’ cost asymmetry and the size of the innovation. Therefore, a
complete diffusion of technology happens in the equilibrium. Our robust finding also supports
the dominance of royalty licensing contracts in practice. Moreover, if the innovator wants to sell
patent right instead of licensing, the inefficient firm acquires the technology which it further
licenses to the efficient firm.
In this paper, the innovation we conceive is ‘common’ innovation in the sense that after
licensing both firms’ cost falls by 𝜖𝜖 from their respective unit costs. But one can conceive of a
technology which reduces both firms’ costs in a non-uniform way. It can also be conceived that

a technology reduces both firms’ costs to new lower level even below the efficient firm’s current
unit cost. This type of cost reducing technology is known as “new technology innovation”. In
future one can examine the optimal mode of technology licensing in a non-uniform cost
reduction environment or of a ‘new technology innovation’ under spatial competitions. We
believe one can expect non-trivial changes in the optimal mode of technology licensing scheme
under alternative specifications.
Also in this paper the location of the competing firms were fixed since our target was
analyzing the optimal mode of technology transfer. But it might be interesting to analyze the
impact of different modes of technology transfer on the optimal level of product differentiation
(or may be product diversity). In that case, we need to make the location choice of the firms
endogenous with the possibility that market may not be fully covered. However, in that set up, to
avoid existence related problems in pure strategies we will require quadratic costs of
transportation instead of linear transport costs assumed here. Extending the research in that
direction (i.e. technology licensing and optimal product differentiation) constitutes an interesting
and ambitious future work that we would like to undertake in near future.
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Appendix 1
Non-Drastic Case (i) (𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿):

If firm A accepts the licensing contract, it’s payoff will be

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 . If firm A

rejects then the game ends and both firm gets their pre-technology transfer profits (outside
option) and therefore firm A will get
𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 ≥
1

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 . Therefore, firm A will accept if

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 +

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 . Thus the outside innovator will optimally charge 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴∗ =

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 −

it can charge 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵∗ =

1

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡
1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 =

𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡+2𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖)

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 −

18𝑡𝑡
1

18𝑡𝑡

from firm A. If the innovator licenses it to firm B

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 =

𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡−2𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖)
18𝑡𝑡

from firm B. Comparing we

get 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴∗ > 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵∗ and therefore it is optimal for the innovator to license it to the efficient firm A and
1

1

𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴∗ = 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 − 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 =

revenue of the innovator.

𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡+2𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖)

∗
= 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹

18𝑡𝑡

Non-Drastic Case (ii) (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 ≤ 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿):

will

be

the

optimum

Under this scenario, if firm A accepts the contract, it becomes a monopoly and its payoff
becomes (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) − 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 . Firm A’s no-acceptance payoff being
optimally charged 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴∗ = (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) −

1

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2, it will be

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 . Again if firm B is offered the license then

both firms remain in the market and firm B’s payoff will be
rejects then it gets its pre-licensing payoff equal to
1

1

18𝑡𝑡
1

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 . If firm B

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 . Thus the maximum that can be

extracted from firm B is 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵∗ = 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 − 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 . Comparing one can show that

𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴∗ > 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵∗ ∀𝜖𝜖 ∈ [3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿, 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) and therefore firm A will again be offered the license for 3𝑡𝑡 −
∗
𝛿𝛿 < 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿. Thus 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
= (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) −
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1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 when 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 < 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿.

Drastic Case (𝜖𝜖 ≥ 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿):

Here if firm A accepts the contract, it becomes a monopoly and its profit net will be (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 −

𝑡𝑡) − 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 . Thus, similar to the previous case firm A will be optimally charged 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴∗ = (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) −
1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 . Similarly if firm B is offered then it becomes a monopoly and therefore firm B
1

1

will be optimally charged 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵∗ = (𝜖𝜖 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) − 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 . Since (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) − 18𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 +

𝛿𝛿)2 > (𝜖𝜖 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) −

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 firm A will be offered the license. The revenue of the outside
1

∗
(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 .
= (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) −
innovator will be 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
18𝑡𝑡

Appendix 2

Non-Drastic Case (i) (𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿):

If both firms accept the contracts, then firm A’s payoff is

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 . If firm A rejects

then given that firm B can potentially accept the contract, firm A’s no-acceptance payoff will be
1

18𝑡𝑡
1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 . Therefore, the outside innovator can optimally charge

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 −

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 > 0 from firm A. Now take the case of firm B. If both firms accept then firm

B’s payoff is

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 . If firm B rejects then given that firm A can potentially get the

license and therefore firm B’s non-acceptance payoff will be
innovator can optimally charge

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 −

1

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 . Therefore, the

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 > 0 from firm B. Adding

∗
these two one can calculate the outside innovator’s total revenue as 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ
=

Non-Drastic Case (ii) (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 ≤ 𝜖𝜖 < 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿):

𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡−𝜖𝜖)
9𝑡𝑡

> 0.

Here we know that if firm A accepts and B does not then firm A becomes a monopoly, but the
reverse is not true. Hence, from firm A the innovator can extract
𝜖𝜖 )2 and from firm B the innovator will be able to extract
1

1

1

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 −

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 . Therefore the innovator
1

∗
(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 −
(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜖𝜖 )2 +
(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 .
=
can optimally earn 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ
18𝑡𝑡
18𝑡𝑡
18𝑡𝑡

Drastic Case (𝜖𝜖 ≥ 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿):

28

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 −

Here, both firms become a monopoly if the other rejects. Therefore the outside innovator can
optimally extract

1

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 and

18𝑡𝑡

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 from firm A and firm B respectively and its

∗
optimum revenue will be 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ
=

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 +

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)2 .

Appendix 3
For 𝜖𝜖 <

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
3

∗
one needs to compare 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ
=

𝜖𝜖 (6𝑡𝑡−𝜖𝜖)
9𝑡𝑡

∗
and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
=

∗
∗
Now 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ
> 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
if and only if 𝜖𝜖 < 2𝛿𝛿. Now comparing

that

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
3

> 2𝛿𝛿 if 𝛿𝛿 <

3𝑡𝑡
.
4

Therefore, for 𝜖𝜖 <

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
3

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
3

2𝜖𝜖(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
9𝑡𝑡

.

and 2𝛿𝛿 we get

the optimum choice between fixed fee and
3𝑡𝑡

auction policy crucially depends on 𝛿𝛿 and can be characterized as if 𝛿𝛿 < 4 , fixed fee to both firms is
optimum for 0 < 𝜖𝜖 < 2𝛿𝛿 and auction to the efficient firm is optimal for 2𝛿𝛿 < 𝜖𝜖 <

fee is optimal for all 0 < 𝜖𝜖 <

For

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

2𝜖𝜖(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
9𝑡𝑡

18𝑡𝑡

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

3𝑡𝑡
,
4

fixed

∗
and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
=

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

< 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿). But if 𝛿𝛿 < 𝑡𝑡 then we have to check the relative

, 6(𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) and (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) and find the optimum accordingly. After calculations

we get that if 𝛿𝛿 <

3𝑡𝑡
5

, 6(𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) > (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) which implies that auction will be preferred for all

< 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿). For

3𝑡𝑡
5

< 𝛿𝛿 <

the efficient firm is preferred for

3𝑡𝑡 2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
4

,

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

3

< 6(𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) and therefore auction to

< 𝜖𝜖 < 6(𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) and fixed fee to the efficient firm will

be preferred for 6(𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) < 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿). Finally if

3𝑡𝑡
4

< 𝛿𝛿 < 𝑡𝑡, 6(𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) >

therefore fixed fee to the efficient firm will be preferred for all

For

If 𝛿𝛿 ≥

∗
. Once again 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴∗ > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
if and only if 𝜖𝜖 > 6(𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿). Therefore if 𝛿𝛿 > 𝑡𝑡, fixed

position of

3

𝜖𝜖(6𝑡𝑡+2𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖)

< 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) we need to compare and 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴∗ =

fee is better for all

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
.
3

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿)
.
3

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )
3

< 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿).

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) ≤ 𝜖𝜖 < (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) we need to compare 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴∗ = (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) −

∗
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
=

1

18𝑡𝑡

2(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿 )

1

18𝑡𝑡

3

and

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 and

(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜖𝜖 )2 and after tedious calculations the choice of fixed fee

licensing vis-à-vis auction policy is characterized as follows: If 𝛿𝛿 < 0.3𝑡𝑡, auction policy will be

preferred to fixed fee licensing for all (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) ≤ 𝜖𝜖ɛ < (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿). If 0. 3𝑡𝑡 < 𝛿𝛿 < 0.6𝑡𝑡, then

� auction policy is
∃ 𝜖𝜖ɛ
� = [(6𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) − �𝛿𝛿(30𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿)] ∈ [(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿), (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)) such that if 𝜖𝜖 < 𝜖𝜖ɛ
optimal, whereas for 𝜖𝜖 > 𝜖𝜖ɛ
� fixed fee licensing to the efficient firm is optimal. If 𝛿𝛿 > 0.6𝑡𝑡, the
29

outside innovator will always select fixed fee licensing over auction for all (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) ≤ 𝜖𝜖 <
(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿).

Finally for the drastic range 𝜖𝜖 ≥ (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) we need to compare 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴∗ = (𝜖𝜖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) −

1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2

∗
and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
= (𝜖𝜖 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑡𝑡) and we get that auction policy will be preferred if 𝛿𝛿 < 0.3𝑡𝑡

and fixed fee licensing to the efficient firm will be preferred if 𝛿𝛿 > 0.3𝑡𝑡.

Appendix 4
The outside innovator will maximize 𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 and the optimum royalty rate should have been 𝑟𝑟 ∗ =
3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖
2

> 0. It can be checked that

3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖
2

> 𝜖𝜖 ∀ 𝜖𝜖 ≤ (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿). Therefore in this case the

optimum 𝑟𝑟 will be set at 𝑟𝑟 ∗ = 𝜖𝜖 which is the upper bound of 𝑟𝑟. 12 The revenue of the innovator

will be 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 =

𝜖𝜖

6𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿). In this situation if firm A accepts the royalty licensing contract it’s

payoff will be 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 =

1

18𝑡𝑡

its pre-licensing payoff

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 . But if firm A rejects then the game ends and firm A will get
1

18𝑡𝑡

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿)2 . Therefore, firm A is weakly better-off accepting this

contract. If 𝜖𝜖 > (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) then there can be two cases. Since the technology transferred is drastic

if 𝑟𝑟 is not sufficiently high then Firm A will become a monopoly and Firm B has to go out of the
market. That critical tariff rate can be easily calculated as 𝑟𝑟 = 𝜖𝜖 − 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 and at this royalty rate

the effective cost reduction is 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 which is sufficient to drive out Firm B from the market. If
this is the case then the innovator’s revenue will be (𝜖𝜖 − 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) as the monopolist now caters
the entire market. But if 𝑟𝑟 is higher than this then both firms will exist in the market. In that case
the optimum royalty charged by the innovator will be 𝑟𝑟 ∗ =

will be 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 =

(3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖)2
24𝑡𝑡

. We need

3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖
2

3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖
2

and the innovator’s revenue

> 𝜖𝜖 − 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 and this leads us to the restriction 𝜖𝜖 <

9𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿. Therefore the innovator’s optimal royalty contract and the revenue can be characterized
as follows: 𝑟𝑟 ∗ = 𝜖𝜖 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 =

𝜖𝜖

(3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) ∀ 𝜖𝜖 ≤ (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿), 𝑟𝑟 ∗ =
6𝑡𝑡

3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖
2

and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 =

(3𝑡𝑡+𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖)2
24𝑡𝑡

if (3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿) < 𝜖𝜖 < 9𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 and finally 𝑟𝑟 ∗ = 𝜖𝜖 − 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 = 𝜖𝜖 − 3𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 ∀ 𝜖𝜖 > 9𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿. In

all the above cases firm A will accept the contract since it gets weakly greater profit compared to
the pre-licensing case.

12

We assume royalty rate 𝑟𝑟 ∗ ≤ 𝜖𝜖, so that the potential licensee has the incentive to accept the licensing contract.
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Now if the innovator decides to license to Firm B then it will maximize 𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 and the optimal
𝜖𝜖

royalty rates and revenue can be calculated similarly as 𝑟𝑟 ∗ = 𝜖𝜖 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟 = 6𝑡𝑡 (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) ∀ 𝜖𝜖 ≤
(3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿), 𝑟𝑟 ∗ =

3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖
2

and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟 =

(3𝑡𝑡−𝛿𝛿+𝜖𝜖)2
24𝑡𝑡

if (3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿) < 𝜖𝜖 < 9𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿 and finally 𝑟𝑟 ∗ = 𝜖𝜖 −

3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟 = 𝜖𝜖 − 3𝑡𝑡 − 𝛿𝛿 ∀ 𝜖𝜖 > 9𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿. One can check that 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 ≥ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟 for all values of

𝜖𝜖 with strict inequality for some 𝜖𝜖 and therefore the innovator will optimally offer the license to
Firm A.
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